Gender-based violence, particularly marital sexual violence, is not merely a social or criminal 
problem. It is, at its core, an economic problem one that sits at the intersection of law, labour 
markets, and institutional design. This paper examines how laws that govern gender-based 
violence, specifically marital rape laws, function as economic institutions that either enable or 
suppress female labour participation, earnings, and productivity. Drawing on empirical evidence 
from European welfare states and a growing body of comparative scholarship, this paper argues 
that the legal recognition and enforcement of marital rape as a crime produces measurable 
economic benefits in the form of higher female workforce participation, reduced absenteeism, 
and greater national productivity. The paper then turns to the implications of these findings for 
emerging economies, with a particular focus on India, where the legal gap on marital rape 
remains deeply contested. The analysis proceeds across six substantive sections: conceptual 
framing, the law-economics interface in gender violence, European comparative evidence, 
productivity cost modelling, policy implications for emerging economies, and a concluding 
synthesis.